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Abstract 
It has been long debated whether regime types have impacts on human development. More 
specifically, compared to authoritarianism, are democracies more likely to provide public goods, 
including infrastructure that improve food provision and health care, and thus enhance health? 
Some studies support an optimistic view, and argue that with the accountability mechanisms of 
democratic elections, democracy is helpful in improving health. Some recent studies challenge the 
optimistic argument, and point out good governance, rather than regime types, as a more crucial 
determinant of human development. Using a newly collected dataset that covers 173 countries 
over the years 1900-2012 and contains more nuanced measures than commonly used, we intend 
to disentangle the debate. The results suggest that across models with various specifications, 
regime types have more consistent effects than quality of government on health outcomes 
throughout the entire period. Furthermore, we find that the mixed results of extant studies are 
due to that 1) the commonly used governance indicators are measured only for the recent 
decades, and the sample does not reflect the entire range of variation; 2) the positive effects of 
democracy are especially salient once the level of democracy has achieved certain threshold; 3) 
the positive effects of democracy are especially stable when both vertical and horizontal 
accountability mechanisms are improved. 
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1. Introduction  
Following the cold war, democracy and human rights became dominating principles of a new 
global order and democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal has been increasingly accepted 
within the international community (Guilhot 2005). Although an extensive literature on 
democracy and democratization has emerged, the questions of whether and to what extent 
democracy can improve the lives of ordinary citizens are still up for discussion (Besley and 
Kudamatsu 2006). 
Lately, a debate has emerged within political science research on the relationship 
between regime types and human welfare. On the one hand, many scholars have provided 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence supporting a positive relationship between 
democracy and human development (Vollmer and Ziegler 2009, Deacon and Saha 2005, Antonis 
et al. 2009, Biser and Edwards 2012, Franco, Álvarez-Dardet and Ruiz 2004, Klomp and de Haan 
2009). On the other hand, this view has been increasingly scrutinized by studies that challenge the 
robustness of the empirical analyses (Ross 2006) and more fundamentally the causality linking the 
two aspects (Gauri and Khaleghian 2002, McGuire 2004, Shandra et al. 2004, Norris 2012, 
Rothstein 2014). A field of research questioning the democracy argument promotes a shift of 
focus from regime type to good governance and the quality of government as a crucial 
determinant of human development and public goods provision (Diamond 2007, Sacks and Levi 
2007, Holmberg and Rothstein 2009 and 2010, Rothstein 2011, Lewis 2006).  
Utilizing a newly collected dataset that covers 173 countries over the years 1900-2012 
and contains more nuanced measures for both democracy and good governance, we intend to 
disentangle the debate and compare the impacts of different aspects of democracy and 
governance on population health. Extant indices of good governance provide data generally for 
only the most recent decades which may result in biased inferences. With regard to the measures 
of regime type, existing studies almost exclusively rely on measures provided by Freedom House 
or Polity IV, which tend to treat democracy as one-dimensional phenomena. Using indicators 
that more concretely capture the democratic accountability mechanisms and distinguish between 
vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms, we further examine the conditions under 
which democracy is more likely to improve health outcomes. 
Our analyses suggest that regime type has more consistent impact on health outcomes 
than the quality of government. The mixed results identified in previous research are partly due 
to incomplete samples of examined cases that do not reflect a rich range of variation across 
countries and years. During the most recent two decades, the variations of the governance 
indicators across non-democracies are quite limited. In addition, we find that the positive impacts 
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of democracy are especially salient when both vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms 
are present. Furthermore, the positive impact of democracy on health outcomes is clearer if the 
threshold effect of democracy is also taken into account. That is, after the transitional period of 
democratization, population health more significantly improves as democracy matures. 
On a policy level, this paper contributes with insights on what factors might have 
positive effects on health in order to get closer to development goals, as defined for example in 
the Millennium Development Goals and in the post-2015 development agenda. It could be of 
value for the development assistance community to get further insights on if democracy 
promotion is truly motivated or if there is a reason to shift focus to other aspects of governance. 
If more states are to succeed in improving human well-being and population health in this case, a 
more precise understanding and knowledge of which aspects of governance and democracy that 
matters is of crucial importance. 
In the following section, we discuss theories linking regime type, quality of governance, 
and public goods provision. Next, we describe data and measures utilized in this paper. After 
presenting the empirical results, we discuss the limitations and future extensions of the study. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Discussion: Democracy, Good Governance, and 
Health Outcomes 
Although the worldwide spread of democracy has instigated a substantial field of literature, some 
critics argue that the main purpose of this research so far has been to examine the causes and 
barriers of the development of representative democracy in different states, while the question of 
how democracies actually perform and influence the lives of their citizens to a large extent has 
been left unanswered (Rothstein 2011). While many studies emphasize that democracies perform 
better than non-democratic states in terms of producing human welfare and providing public 
goods for their citizens (Vollmer and Ziegler 2009, Deacon and Saha 2005, Antonis et al. 2009, 
Biser and Edwards 2012, Franco, Álvarez-Dardet and Ruiz 2004, Klomp and de Haan 2009), this 
claim is now being increasingly questioned based on the notion that many democracies fail in 
these aspects (Ross 2006, Holmberg and Rothstein 2010, Rothstein 2011, Diamond 2007). As 
emphasized by Besley and Kudamatsu (2006:313), in spite of the substantial increase of 
democratic states around the world, the question of how regime type affects the well-being of the 
world population is still open to debate. 
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2.1. The Effects of Regime Type 
A number of scholars have identified that democracy promotes human welfare and the provision 
of public goods in terms of infrastructure, water, public sanitation and public schooling (Deacon 
and Saha 2005, Antonis et al. 2009, Biser and Edwards 2012), whereas some has looked more 
specifically on health outcomes. For example, Franco, Álvarez-Dardet and Ruiz (2004) find that 
democracy shows an independent positive impact on life expectancy, maternal mortality and 
infant mortality, taking a country's wealth, level of inequality and size of the public sector into 
account. Similarly, a study by Klomp and de Haan (2009) suggests that there is indeed a positive 
relationship between democracy and individual health. With a focus on sub-Saharan Africa, 
Kudamatsu (2012) points out that infant mortality rates fall after democratization in the post-
Cold War period. Furthermore, Besley and Kundamatsu (2006) argue that health policy 
interventions are superior in democratic states. 
Scholars have pointed out several mechanisms through which democracies are more 
likely to provide public goods and improve human development. The various mechanisms can be 
classified into three categories: representation, accountability and selection (Besley and 
Kudamatsu 2006:313-314, Harding and Wantchekon 2010:14-18), all of which rest on 
competitive elections of democracies.  
The representation mechanism relates to preferences represented by those who control 
political office. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) refer to democracies as dictatorships of the poor 
and middle class citizens and autocracies as dictatorships of the rich.  
According to this argument, human welfare will increase if it is of importance to the dominating 
groups of the democracy, compared to the groups dominating in an autocracy. Through 
competitive elections, the redistributive scheme in a democratic regime is more likely to reflect 
the preference of the median voter, belonging to the middle and lower class (Vollmer and Ziegler 
2009). One can expect greater provision of public goods in a democracy than in an autocracy, 
since the people represented by the power holders of a democratic system have higher 
preferences and demands for redistribution of resources and public services. In authoritarian 
regimes, however, redistribution incentives are missing and fewer public goods are provided 
(Besley and Kudamatsu 2006:313-314, Harding and Wantchekon 2010:14-18). 
The accountability argument is based on that in democracies, citizens have the ability to 
hold politicians accountable through elections. As a result, decision-makers feel obligated to 
provide a wider range of the population with public goods in order to meet the expectations of 
the voters and stay in power in the next elections, while power holders in autocracies are 
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accountable only to a narrow group of people (Besley and Kudamatsu 2006:313-314,Harding and 
Wantchekon 2010:14-18). 
The selection argument emphasizes the process of appointing political leaders and 
government officials as an important difference between democratic and autocratic states. In 
democracies, the mechanisms to select credible and competent politicians are stronger than in 
autocracies. Hence, health intervention policies in democracies are supported and implemented 
by knowledgeable and impartial officials, which leads to improved health outcomes, unlike in 
autocratic states where public servants might not be selected on a merit-base (Besley and 
Kudamatsu 2006:313-314, Harding and Wantchekon 2010:14-18). 
 
2.2. The Debate 
While many theoretical arguments and empirical analyses suggest that democracy has positive 
effects on human welfare, some recent studies criticize this optimistic view. Some of the 
criticisms focus on the quality of empirical analyses conducted in previous works, while others more 
fundamentally question the causal relationship between regime types and public goods provision. 
The empirical evidence supporting the optimistic view has been criticized as scarce, 
based on biased samples and open to scientific debate (Ross 2006). In addition, other studies find 
only a weak, non-existent or even negative relationship between democracy and different aspects 
of health (Gauri and Khaleghian 2002, McGuire 2004, Ross 2006, Shandra et al. 2004, Rothstein 
2011). According to Ross (2006:860-861), past quantitative cross-national studies confirming the 
optimistic view have been flawed by not taking into account global health trends and country-specific 
effects, which complicate the possibility to trace the correct factors driving positive health 
developments. Another issue brought forward is the limited and biased sample of countries included in 
many of the studies: when data to a much larger extent is available for democratic states but 
missing for non-democracies, the results are based on a smaller skewed sample of countries. In 
many studies, nondemocratic states with good economic social development have been excluded 
from the analysis, resulting in a false impression that democracies perform better than non-
democracies. 
Once these flaws are corrected, the study carried out by Ross (2006:868-871) suggests 
that democracy has little or no effect on health indicators such as infant and child mortality. 
Similarly, Shandra et al. (2004) discover that the level of democracy does not have a significant 
effect on infant mortality rate. Gauri and Khaleghian (2002) find that immunization coverage 
rates are actually lower in democracies than autocracies across developing countries. Norris 
(2012) investigates the effect of liberal democracy on a number of aspects of human well-being, 
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captured by the Millennium Development Goals, and her analysis shows no positive impact on 
either longevity nor child mortality. Overall, based on the uneven track records of democracies’ 
ability to ensure human welfare, many argue that representative democracy does not seem to be a 
safe cure against under-provision of welfare (Holmberg and Rothstein 2010, Ross 2006, 
Diamond 2007).  
Another thread of research questions the causal relationship between democracy and 
public goods provision, and points out good governance, rather than regime type, as the main 
determinant of desirable social outcomes. An extensive literature on the importance of good 
governance has emerged, paying attention to its impacts on various aspects of social wellbeing 
(Diamond 2007, Sacks and Levi 2007, Holmberg and Rothstein 2009 and 2010, Rothstein 2011, 
Lewis 2006, Norris 2012). 
According to Diamond (2007:119), democracy today is haunted by a ghost. That is, bad 
governance in the form of corruption, favoritism, patronage and abuse of power, which weakens 
several mechanisms through which democratic officials have more incentives to improve 
population health. Rothstein and Holmberg (2010) offer an overview of the relation between 
variables that measure the quality of government, such as rule of law, control of corruption and 
government effectiveness, and a number of standard measures of population health. The overall 
finding is that different aspects of quality of government are positively related to standard 
measures of population health such as life expectancy at birth and infant mortality.  
Another group of scholars point out the importance of the “age” of democracy and 
argue that the accountability mechanism works better in older democracies. Keefer and Vlaicu 
(2004:25-27) state that politicians in young democracies tend to fail to make credible promises to 
their voters, and thus are likely to engage in direct and contingent exchanges rather than provide 
public goods once in office. Political leaders in older democracies, on the other hand, have a 
greater opportunity to create credible policy reputations among a wider range of voters and are 
able to offer a more extensive provision of public goods. The argument is supported also by 
empirical evidence (Keefer 2005). Similarly, Gerring et al. (2012) argue that the relationship 
between democracy and human development is a time-dependent phenomenon. According to 
the authors, there is only slight evidence for a positive relationship between democracy and infant 
mortality and over the past century, it is the stock of democracy that in fact affects infant 
mortality. 
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2.3. Hypothesis 
As evident from the theoretical discussion, whether and the conditions under which democracy 
improves population health is still under debate. In this paper, we intend to test these arguments 
more thoroughly, with a newly collected dataset that covers most sovereign countries from 1900 
to 2012 for indicators of regime type and governance quality. As Ross (2006) points out, 
incomplete samples may result in biased inferences. Previous works that compare the effects of 
regime type and governance are limited by extant governance indices measured only for the 
recent decades. In the empirical analyses, we incorporate controls that capture global health 
trends and country-specific effects, and apply various model specifications for imputed data sets 
to ensure the robustness of the tests. 
More importantly, when comparing the effects of democracy and quality of 
government, we focus on specific accountability mechanisms of democracy. The skepticism 
towards democracy promotion and the argument that democracy promotes various desirable 
social outcomes has raised an awareness of the need to discuss different dimensions of 
democracy. However, in large parts of the literature on the effects of democracy, as well as the 
critique towards it, focus is merely on a few aspects of democracy. In addition, extant studies 
almost exclusively rely on measures provided by Freedom House, Polity IV and Economist 
Intelligence Unit, which tend to treat various aspects of democracy as one-dimensional 
phenomena. Although these studies in theory elaborate on particular dimensions and 
mechanisms of democracy, such as elections, representations, or checks and balances, in practice 
in their empirical analysis they tend to rely on one-dimensional measures that combine different 
features of democracies. 
We argue that vertical accountability (competitive elections) and horizontal 
accountability (legislative constraints on the executive) mechanisms of democracy are both 
important to improve population health. The distinction between them is commonly used in the 
literature to refer to different types of accountability mechanisms regarding the spatial direction 
of the accountability relationships (Schedler 1999, Lindberg 2013). Accountability in this context 
is defined as the main instrument through which both public institutions and individuals are 
subject to monitoring and control by citizens as well as other public institutions (World Bank 
Institute 2005).  
Vertical accountability allows citizens to hold governments and politicians directly 
accountable through free and fair elections, along with freedoms of expression, free media, and 
freedom of association (O’Donnell 1998). The presence of these factors combined enables 
citizens to voice and demand their preferences to politicians and public institutions. Through the 
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mechanism of regular competitive elections citizen can freely articulate their preferences for 
policies. Holding regular elections does not automatically mean that these elections correspond to 
the will of the citizens, as more than half of the current elections in the world violate the 
democratic principles of basic freedom and fairness, and the respect for human rights 
(Diamond 2002, Hafner-Burton et al 2013:152, Lindberg 2006, 2009, Schedler 2002). Hence, 
factors such as suffrage, freedom of association, and the level of “cleanness” of elections in terms 
of absence of fraud or systematic irregularities need to be taken into account to assess the effect 
of electoral democracy.  In addition, since elections occur only periodically, the ability of citizens 
to freely associate in political parties and non-governmental organizations are crucial elements in 
order to secure vertical accountability also in the period between elections. 
Horizontal accountability is achieved when there is oversight between different state 
institutions in terms of checks and balances, preventing abuses of political power. When, for 
example, the legislature engages in executive oversight or a constitutional court reviews acts 
adopted by the legislature, this is a form of accountability that runs horizontally ‘among equals’ 
(O’Donnell,1998, Lindberg 2013). A focus on legislative control is based on the idea that 
legislatures are the primary national-level agency through which popular preferences are 
institutionally represented, laws are passed, and restraint can be imposed on the executive. As 
Keefer and Vlaicu (2004) point out, politicians in young democracies are less able to make 
credible policy commitments. We argue that legislatures can serve as a credible constraint on 
government’s behavior of only transferring benefits to narrow groups of voters. With the 
capability of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive, legislatures 
are more likely to counterbalance the tendency of delivering clientelistic benefits that are 
contingent on the support of the governing party. That is, with the mechanism of horizontal 
accountability, policy commitments offered by politicians are more likely to be credible, and thus 
politicians have more incentives to provide large-scale benefits. Based on these arguments, we 
plan to test the following opposing hypotheses: 
H1.1: Democratic accountability mechanism has a stronger impact on population health than quality of 
government.   
H1.2: Quality of government has a stronger impact on population health than regime type. 
Furthermore, we hypothesize that vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms 
work as complements. Competitive elections or legislative constraints separately are not enough 
to ensure improved health outcomes. Executive and legislative politicians have incentives to 
represent citizens’ preferences and deliver goods only when they are faced with the uncertainty of 
re-election. Legislative control is required so that government officials selected through 
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competitive elections are more likely to make credible commitments of providing public goods. 
That is, the effects of these two accountability mechanisms are more salient if the other 
mechanism is also present. Based on these arguments, a hypothesis on the joint effect of vertical 
and horizontal accountability mechanisms is proposed:  
H2: The impact of democracy on population health is more salient if both vertical and horizontal accountability 
mechanisms are strengthened. 
Related to the joint effect of different dimensions of democracy, we also expect that at 
the early stage of democratization, increased political rights do not necessarily lead to the 
improvement of population health. Transitional societies, although allowing more political 
competition than close autocracies, still lack democratic accountability mechanisms. That is, 
democracies without well-functioned accountability mechanisms are less able to achieve 
significant improvement in population health. Only when politicians and citizens have recognized 
that winning competitive elections is the only way to political power, and providing public goods 
to a larger scale of population is helpful in attracting votes, accountability mechanisms function 
better. In other words, there is a threshold effect of democracy on health outcome. The positive 
impact of democracy on population health is especially significant after the early stage of 
democratic transition. Based on this expectation, a third hypothesis is proposed:  
H3: There is a threshold effect of democracy on population health. The positive impact of democracy is more salient 
as democracy matures.   
 
 
3. Data and Measures 
To explore the effects of regime types and quality of government on health outcomes, we utilize 
mainly the new data produced by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (dataset version 
4.3)1. The V-Dem dataset is currently the largest dataset on democracy, collecting data for 173 
polities in the world for 400+ indicators from 1900 to 2012 (for 60 countries also for 2013-2014).  
The project distinguishes among seven main principles of democracy (electoral, liberal, 
deliberative, majoritarian, consensual, egalitarian, and participatory) that are disaggregated into 
around fifty constituent component parts, each measured by several detailed and concrete 
indicators. The disaggregated nature of the V-Dem data allows the selection of indicators that 
more accurately capture the theoretical concepts motivated in this paper.  
                                                      
1 See https://v-dem.net for more information about the project and the codebook. 
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Different from existing datasets, which usually rely on a small group of experts who rate 
all countries or ask each expert to code one single unit, V-Dem project has invited over 2,500 
local and cross-national experts to provide judgments on various indicators about democracy 
(Coppedge et al. 2011, 2015). Thus, the dataset is compiled by gathering factual information 
from existing data sources, and by expert coding for questions that require evaluation. Experts’ 
ratings are aggregated through a Bayesian item response theory model (Pemstein et al. 2015). The 
model takes into account the possibilities that experts may make mistakes and have different 
scales in mind when providing judgments. In addition, bridging-coders, experts who coded 
multiple countries, are recruited to calibrate the scales of estimates cross-nationally. Finally, the 
project is completely transparent regarding coding procedures, the measurement model that 
processes the country experts’ data, the aggregation decisions of the composite indicators, and 
thus for possible sources of measurement error. 
 
3.1. Independent Variables: Democracy and Quality of Government  
To test whether the mechanisms that require politicians to represent and be accountable to their 
citizens are helpful for population health, we utilize two measures that capture vertical and 
horizontal accountability. For the former, we rely on the electoral accountability index from the V-
Dem dataset that fits quite accurately the conceptualization used in this paper for vertical 
accountability. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme the electoral principle of democracy is defined as 
selecting responsive and accountable leaders to citizens through the mechanism of competitive 
meaningful elections as captured by Dahl’s conceptualization for “polyarchy” (1989). This is 
assumed to be achieved when elections are free and fair; the executive is selected (directly or 
indirectly) through elections; suffrage is extensive; and, finally, political and civil society 
organizations can operate freely. To capture this definition, the electoral accountability index 
combines indicators on the level of suffrage, freedom to join political and civil society 
organizations, whether elections are clean and without systematic irregularities, and whether the 
chief executive is selected through elections2. 
To capture the concept of horizontal accountability as defined above, we utilize the 
legislative constraints on the executive index, which focuses on the extent to which the national 
legislature/parliament are capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the 
executive. This index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis 
                                                      
2 For detailed information on the aggregation formula and the exact question formulation of the indicators going 
into the index, see the Appendix, Table A.1 and A.2. It has to be noted that while expert survey questionnaire 
provides ordinal raw scores, the measurement model produces interval-level estimates of latent traits with roughly 0 
as the average and 1 as the standard deviation when aggregating experts’ ratings. 
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model of four indicators that examine whether the legislature can question executive branch 
officials in practice; whether the legislature and other bodies (comptroller general, general 
prosecutor or ombudsman) are able to investigate the executive in practice; and, finally, whether 
legislature opposition parties are able to exercise oversight over the governing party3. 
We also include the widely used composite democracy index provided by Polity IV 
(Marshall 2013) as an alternative measure, which is aggregated by weighted addition of five sub-
components: competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness and 
regulation of political participation, and constraints on the chief executive (a bigger weigh is 
assigned to this sub-component). The resulting polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) and the data is available from 1946 to 20124.  
Quality of government is a rather broad term, which can be both conceptualized and 
measured in various ways. Previous research has used measures including corruption, 
government effectiveness and rule of law. This paper relies on a more specific definition of QoG 
as “the impartiality of institutions that exercise government authority”, provided by Rothstein 
and Teorell (2008:165) and is measured by combining into an index five V-Dem indicators that 
focus on corruption in state institutions. Throughout this paper we refer to this index as the no-
corruption index. The exact language of the corruption indicators that constitute this measure can 
be found in the Appendix in Table A.1. The literature has pointed out that corruption is an 
important indication of bad governance, and may lead to the distorted distribution of public 
resources (Diamond 2007, Rothstein 2011).  
As McMann et al (2015) have argued there are three main advantages of the no-corruption 
index based on the V-Dem data than other widely used measures of corruption: content validity, 
coverage and sources used to collect the data: 
First, the V-Dem corruption indictors resonate with the accepted academic usage of the 
term corruption as the use of public office for private gain (Gerring, 2001:117-119, McMann et al 
2015). The five indicators that constitute the index look at levels of corruption within the main 
public officeholders: the executive, members of the legislature, members of the judiciary, and 
public sector employees. It is consistent with our inquiry of exploring the effects of the general 
quality of government, the corruption in the state institutions and public officials as an indication, 
on health outcome. In addition, the wording of the indicators captures different corruption 
forms, including bribes, undocumented extra payments, kickbacks, theft, embezzlement and 
misappropriation. Surveys of firms or the general public, on the other hand, provide narrower 
                                                      
3 For the exact question formulation of the indicators going into the index, see the Appendix, Table A.1 and A.2. 
4 The electoral accountability index is correlated to the polity score at 0.87, while the legislative constraint index is 
correlated to it at 0.85. 
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perspectives on the use of public office for private gain than judgments of specialists in the 
politics of the country (McMann et al 2015). 
Secondly, as stressed in the previous section, one unique feature of the V-Dem data is 
that it allows over-time and cross-country comparisons of democracies going all the way back to 
1900. This advantage allows an important contribution to the study of democracy and quality of 
government as existing measures are not designed for panel analysis. With a sensitive topic such 
as corruption, potential biases introduced by limited coverage of the dataset over time and across 
countries could be particularly influential. Missing data could possibly be not missing at random 
but selection bias could be introduced in the process of deciding which cases to include or 
exclude (McMann et al 2015, Treisman 2007). Thus, big variation of levels and types of 
corruption could be lost as a result of limited coverage of data. Table 1 compares the no-
corruption index and three other commonly used measures (TI Corruption Perceptions Index, 
and two World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (Rule of Law and Government 
Effectiveness) (Transparency International 2013, Kaufmann et al 2010). The table shows that the 
time range covered by the three measures reaches 14 years for maximum 158 countries, 
compared to the 172 countries for 114 years of the V-Dem data. The correlation coefficients of 
the index used in this paper with the alternative measures are between .85 and .88. That is, 
country-years rated as more corrupt by extant measures of corruption also tend to be rated as 
more corrupt by the V-Dem index, and the other way around5. The pattern is also evident in 
Figure 1, in which the standardized average scores across countries on these indices are shown. 
We also include these alternative measures in the analyses to verify the findings. 
Table 1. The Comparison of Governance Indices 
  Correlation coefficients with V-Dem no-corruption index 
Coverage 
TI Corruption 
Perceptions Index  0.8878 
1995 – 2013 
N: 185 n: 2429 !: 128 !: 13 
WB Rule of Law  0.8710 
1996 – 2012 
N: 195 n: 2686 !: 158 !: 14 
WB Government 
Effectiveness  0.8587 
1996 – 2012 
N: 193 n: 2629 !: 155 !: 14 
 
                                                      
5 For a more detailed discussion of the systematic differences between the V-Dem corruption measures and some 
other existing indices see McMann et al. (2015). 
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Figure 1. Country Average Scores on Different Governance Indices 
 
 
Finally, the variables used in the no-corruption index follow the same data collection 
method for all countries to facilitate cross-national analysis. In comparison, datasets that rely on 
different sources across countries are not ideal for this purpose (McMann et al 2015). Thus, the 
V-Dem no-corruption index also demonstrates consistency across time and countries. In 
addition, the inclusion of numerous possible forms of corruption makes our indicators more 
broadly applicable and less restrictive across contexts (Gerring, 2001:121-124), since the index 
takes into account the fact that some forms of corruption are more widespread in some place and 
time than in others. 
 
3.2. Dependent Variable 
Consistent with existing research on the effects of democracy and governance on health 
outcomes (Shandra et al. 2004, Ross 2006, Rothstein & Holmberg 2010, Norris 2012, Gerring et 
al. 2012), we utilize the data on infant and child mortality rate as an indication of population 
health. The main dependent variable we use is infant mortality rate calculated as the number of 
deaths prior to age 1 per 1000 live births in a year. The base variable is drawn from Gapminder6, 
                                                      
6 Gapminder. Accessed May 15, 2014. http://www.gapminder.org/data/ 
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with additional data imputed from Clio-Infra7. The resulting measure covers all countries in the 
V-Dem dataset from 1900 to 2012 although the coverage is limited for certain countries in the 
beginning of the century8. 
The measures on infant and child mortality rate are transformed by the natural 
logarithm in all following models (except for the poisson model included in the Appendix Table 
A.4), consistent with previous research done on the topic as the distribution of this variable is 
right-skewed reflecting the general downward trend in mortality in many developed countries in 
recent decades. In addition, the theoretical argument behind the logged transformation is that 
mortality rate is more resilient at higher rates as improvements in number of mortality are easier 
to achieve when the rate is higher.  
We also use a measure for mortality rate under 5 as an alternative dependent variable. 
The data is provided by the Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (IGME, 2004) 
that measures the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if 
subject to current age-specific mortality rates. This time-series, however, covers only the period 
from 1960 to 2010. 
 
3.3. Controls 
We include several likely confounders as control variables in our models. In order to take into 
account the general level of development of a country, we include a measure for GDP per capita, 
transformed by the natural logarithm9 and an additional indicator for urbanization rate, measured 
as ratio of urban population to total population10. We also include a V-Dem measure for 
“stateness” - domestic autonomy that gives information whether the state is autonomous from 
the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy, where high values 
indicate full autonomy and low values refer to an authority exercised by external power (see the 
Appendix Table A.1). Since the infant mortality rate rises significantly when a country is under 
conflict, we also include two dummy variables that identify whether the country participated in an 
international armed conflict or whether it experienced an internal armed conflict 11 in the year. To 
measure the overall regime performance, we include an indicator for GDP growth rate12. Finally, 
to control for oil rents, we use a variable that captures the real value of petroleum produced per 
                                                      
7 Clio-Infra. Accessed May 27, 2014. http://www.clio-infra.eu/. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated for 
each variable, increasing the number of observations as follows: (a): from 11592 to 12185; (b): from 567 to 5369. 
Missing data for (a) is imputed with (b), and increasing the number of observations from 12185 to 13566. 
8 See the Appendix Table A.5 for a list of country-years included in the analyses. 
9 Source: The Maddison-Project (2013). 
10 Sources: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu). 
11 Both variables are extracted from Clio Infra, drawing on Brecke (2001). 
12 Source: The Maddison-Project (2013) 
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capita.13 The descriptive statistics of variables included in the analyses can be found in the 
Appendix in Table A.3. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Democracy or Quality of Government? 
To test our hypothesis on the effects of democracy and governance on health outcomes, we 
estimate time-series cross-sectional models with fixed effects. To begin with, as explanatory 
variables we use indicators that have been previously used in similar studies to replicate the 
findings. The results are included in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Regression estimates of the effect of democracy and governance on infant mortality  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Infant mortality rate, logged 
Polity -0.00326 -0.000377 -0.00105 -0.000532       
  [0.00173] [0.000598] [0.000750] [0.000590]       
Electoral Principle          -0.00636 -0.092*** -0.0129 
          [0.0180] [0.0221] [0.0178] 
WB Rule of Law -0.0426* -0.0149*     -0.0188**     
  [0.0190] [0.00653]     [0.00655]     
TI Corruption      -0.00533     -0.00468   
Perceptions Index     [0.00281]     [0.00284]   
WB Government        -0.0134*     -0.00971 
Effectiveness       [0.00643]     [0.00643] 
GDP per capita, logged -0.590*** -0.0323*** -0.0683*** -0.0318*** -0.0322** -0.069*** -0.0327** 
  [0.0204] [0.00905] [0.0131] [0.00912] [0.00979] [0.0130] [0.00999] 
Urbanization rate -3.649*** -0.120 -0.181 -0.132 -0.0169 -0.110 -0.0246 
  [0.192] [0.0841] [0.103] [0.0846] [0.0842] [0.103] [0.0848] 
Lagged DV   0.955*** 0.930*** 0.953*** 0.956*** 0.934*** 0.957*** 
    [0.0130] [0.0160] [0.0131] [0.0131] [0.0160] [0.0132] 
_cons 9.999*** 0.418*** 0.845*** 0.427*** 0.361** 0.846*** 0.371*** 
 [0.156] [0.105] [0.145] [0.105] [0.111] [0.145] [0.111] 
Country FE v v v v v v v 
Year FE  v v v v v v 
Lagged DV  v v v v v v 
Countries 148 148 146 148 144 143 144 
N 1678 1678 1605 1677 1646 1571 1645 
Log likelihood 1223.6 3035.8 2779.2 3033.3 2984.8 2726.0 2979.4 
adj. R-sq (within) 0.550 0.948 0.934 0.947 0.949 0.935 0.948 
All independent variables are lagged for one year. Coefficients of yearly dummies are not reported. Standard error in brackets * 
p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 
Across all models the independent variables are lagged by one year. In model 1, only 
country fixed-effects are included, while in all other models we add yearly dummies and lagged 
dependent variable. Yearly dummies are included to control for the general global health trends 
and other contemporaneous factors. One-year lagged dependent variable is added to the models 
                                                      
13 Sources: Haber and Menaldo (2011) 
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to test whether the change of infant mortality rate from one year to another is influenced by 
democracy and quality of government. A lagged dependent variable also serves as a proxy for 
omitted variables and controls for the possibility of temporal correlation. 
Overall the results presented in Table 2 replicate the finding that there is a positive 
effect of good governance on health outcomes.  The polity scores, used as a measure for level of 
democracy, do not come out as a statistically significant predictor of infant mortality in any of the 
models, while the indicators on rule of law and government effectiveness (WB) are estimated to 
reduce the rate of infant mortality (Models 1, 2 and 4). Although the TI measure on corruption 
does not cross the significance threshold (Model 3), we find that the other two proxies for 
governance are significant predictors of mortality, especially when adequate controls are included.  
In Models 5, 6 and 7 we include the V-Dem electoral principle of democracy index as one of the 
main explanatory variables. Across models the electoral democracy index shows statistically 
significant effect only in one of the specifications, while the WB rule of law indicator retains its 
statistical significance. 
As the previous section has pointed out, the commonly used indicators of governance 
included in Table 2 are measured for the recent two decades, thus the total number of 
observations in the regression analysis above is around 1600. To test whether the omitted 
countries and years in the first set of models are introducing bias, we include the no-corruption 
index as a proxy for governance in the models presented in Table 3. Table A.5 in the Appendix 
compares countries and years covered in the first model of Table 2 and 3. 
The most important findings from this round of analysis are that the electoral component 
index and the legislative control index have consistent positive effects on health outcomes, even when 
the lagged dependent variable and other relevant controls are included in the model (GDP 
growth, oil rents, domestic autonomy and occurrence of conflicts). The effects of democracy, 
either measured as the quality of competitive elections or the capacity of legislative constraints, 
are largely reduced but still significant if the lagged dependent variable is controlled. Table A.4 in 
the Appendix shows the results of additional robustness checks, including those based on 
imputed data, and the same patterns prevail. 
Based on model 2 and 5, a one standard deviation increase on the electoral principle or 
the legislative constraint index is associated with a decrease in infant mortality rate of more than 1 
per 1000. However, the effects of the no-corruption index are less clear as the indicator does not 
show statistically significant results in the presence of other important factors to health. In one of 
the alternative specifications where mortality rate under 5 years is used as the dependent variable 
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(sample covers 1960-2012), the indicator even has a positive effect on mortality rates, opposite to 
the negative relationship as we expected. 
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Table 3. Regression estimates of the effect of democracy and governance on health, 1900-2012 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Infant Mortality Rate, logged Mortality Rate Under 5, 
logged 
Electoral Principle -0.485*** -0.0393*** -0.0520***    -0.0308***  
 [0.0285] [0.00736] [0.00853]    [0.00515]  
Legislative Constraints       -0.259*** -0.0208*** -0.0238***   -0.0378*** 
        [0.0217] [0.00555] [0.00632]   [0.00351] 
No-Corruption -0.0283 -0.0292*** -0.00768 -0.0427 -0.0321*** -0.0180 0.0565*** 0.0627*** 
  [0.0326] [0.00838] [0.0102] [0.0323] [0.00821] [0.00988] [0.00586] [0.00566] 
GDP per capita, logged  -0.786*** -0.0173*** -0.0176*** -0.819*** -0.0181*** -0.0195*** 0.00732** 0.00612** 
  [0.0117] [0.00372] [0.00448] [0.0115] [0.00367] [0.00445] [0.00234] [0.00230] 
Urbanization Rate  -2.406*** 0.00696 -0.00650 -2.605*** 0.00292 -0.0108 0.0142 0.0136 
  [0.0546] [0.0175] [0.0193] [0.0520] [0.0173] [0.0191] [0.0133] [0.0130] 
Lagged DV   0.943*** 0.936***   0.944*** 0.938*** 0.986*** 0.987*** 
    [0.00340] [0.00397]   [0.00333] [0.00390] [0.00276] [0.00270] 
GDP Growth Rate      -0.0009***     -0.0009***     
      [0.00018]     [0.00018]     
Petroleum Produced      0.0000002     0.0000003     
per capita     [0.000001]     [0.000001]     
Domestic Autonomy      0.00381     0.00207     
      [0.00274]     [0.00272]     
Armed Conflict,      0.00556     0.00734     
International     [0.00410]     [0.00402]     
Armed Conflict,      -0.00522     -0.00488     
Internal     [0.00362]     [0.00357]     
_cons 11.47*** 0.360*** 0.409*** 11.74*** 0.373*** 0.409*** -0.0652* -0.0600* 
 [0.0761] [0.0463] [0.0530] [0.0752] [0.0436] [0.0510] [0.0274] [0.0269] 
Country FE v v v v v v v v 
Year FE  v v v  v v v 
Lagged DV  v v v  v v v 
Countries 146 146 106 146 146 106 145 145 
N 8055 7942 5739 8217 8088 5851 5222 5281 
Log likelihood -2642.8 9027.0 7044.5 -2797.4 9220.4 7184.7 9955.2 10130.3 
adj. R-sq 0.810 0.990 0.992 0.810 0.990 0.992 0.995 0.995 
All independent variables are lagged for one year. Coefficients of yearly dummies are not reported. Standard error in brackets * p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001.  
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4.2. The Incomplete Sample 
To explore why the results from the two tables presented above differ so extensively we first 
analyze the difference in the samples. The number of cases in Table 3 compared to Table 2 
increases approximately 3.5 times in the models when all control variables are included and 5 
times in the baseline models. The list of the countries and the year-range included in the 
regression analysis, documented in Table A.5 in the Appendix, reveals that the difference in the 
number of observations comes from the much richer data of country-years prior to 1996. 
To examine how the difference in data coverage affects the variations of the main explanatory 
variables, we first depict the relationship between the levels of democracy measured as the quality 
of elections and the no-corruption index of all observations (country-years) from 1900 to 2012. 
Figure 2 shows the scatterplot. The figure suggests that across the entire time period, we can 
observe all different kinds of combinations between these two indicators. In addition to data 
points in the first and the third quadrants, there are some country-years rated high on the no-
corruption but low on the electoral index, while others have free and fair elections but lag behind 
in terms of the quality of government.  
 
Figure 2: The relationship between electoral principle and no-corruption indices (1900-
2012) 
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In the figure, colors represent different years, and suggest that the observed 
combinations of the values of electoral and no-corruption indices seem to vary over time. Back in 
time, there were more countries that had a high quality of government but did not hold 
competitive elections; while recently, the combination of low values on the no-corruption index 
and high-values on the electoral index is more common. 
To further verify this pattern, Figure 3 shows the scatterplot between the no-corruption 
and the electoral indices but only for observations after 1996 when the WB and TI governance 
indicators start to be measured. The figure shows that there is a roughly positive relationship 
between the two indicators. In addition, there are many countries that hold competitive elections 
but have corrupt governments. Contrary to the previous figure that covers the entire period 
between 1900 and 2012, it is rare to observe the combination of low values on the electoral index 
but high values on the governance index. The same pattern prevails in Figure 4 and 5, when the 
polity scores are used as the measure of regime types and TI corruption perception index as the 
measure of governance. 
 
Figure 3: The relationship between electoral principle and no-corruption indices (1996-
2012) 
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indicators used in previous research are only measured for the most recent two decades. To 
verify whether it is the limited coverage that results in the conflicting results shown in Table 2 
and 3, we estimate the same models as those in Table 3 but limit the analysis only to observations 
after 1996. The results are presented in models 1 to 6 in Table 4. 
The model coefficients are consistent with some previous studies, and show that for this 
time period, the no-corruption index has more consistent and significant positive effects on 
health than regime types, either measured as competitive elections, legislative constraints, or the 
polity scores. 
 
Figure 4: The relationship between polity and no-corruption indices (1996-2012) 
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Figure 5: The relationship between electoral principle and TI corruption perception 
indices (1996-2012) 
 
 
Table 4. Regression estimates of the effect of democracy and governance on health 
  
(1) 
1996- 
(2) 
1996- 
(3) 
1996- 
(4) 
1996- 
(5) 
1996- 
(6) 
1996- 
(7) 
1946- 
  Infant Mortality Rate, logged 
Electoral Principle -0.00288 0.0661          
  [0.0504] [0.0339]          
Legislative Constraints      -0.106** 0.0545*      
      [0.0404] [0.0272]      
Polity          -0.0052*** -0.00043 -.00018*** 
          [0.00156] [0.00105] [0.00238] 
No-Corruption Index  -0.132* -0.106** -0.0703 -0.114** -0.116 -0.114** -0.0105 
  [0.0610] [0.0409] [0.0630] [0.0421] [0.0602] [0.0402] [0.0087] 
GDP per capita,logged  -0.689*** -0.184*** -0.687*** -0.183*** -0.685*** -0.184*** -.00125*** 
  [0.0187] [0.0166] [0.0187] [0.0165] [0.0189] [0.0167] [0.0037] 
Urbanization Rate  -3.481*** 0.0769 -3.485*** 0.0932 -3.499*** 0.0617 0.0366* 
  [0.163] [0.142] [0.161] [0.141] [0.166] [0.144] [0.018] 
Lagged DV   0.421***   0.424***   0.418*** 0.935*** 
    [0.0201]   [0.0199]   [0.0202] [0.0038] 
_cons 10.75*** 3.319*** 10.78*** 3.298*** 10.75*** 3.387*** 0.269*** 
 
[0.141] [0.182] [0.139] [0.181] [0.142] [0.182] [0.0414] 
Country FE v v v v v v v 
Year FE  v  v  v v 
Lagged DV  v  v  v v 
N 2012 2012 2030 2030 1971 1971 6327 
Countries 143 143 144 144 140 140 143 
Log likelihood 1504.3 2328.6 1521.6 2358.0 1473.4 2289.5 8084.4 
adj. R-sq 0.602 0.823 0.603 0.824 0.606 0.826 0.987 
All independent variables are lagged for one year. Coefficients of yearly dummies are not reported. Standard error in brackets * 
p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 
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In model 7, we conduct the same analysis with polity scores as the measure of regime 
type and for the entire time period since the polity data is available (1946). Similar with results 
shown in Table 3, democracy significantly reduces infant mortality rates, while the effects of 
corrupt governance are less clear. These analyses suggest that the conflicting results identified in 
the literature and also in the previous section are to a larger extent due to the limited coverage of 
samples than different measures of democracy. The result that quality of government rather than 
democracy is the crucial determinant of health holds only for a sample of most recent decades, 
which does not reflect the entire range of variations. 
We also estimate the model for samples of other time periods. For example, the 
indicator of mortality rates under 5, provided by the United Nations IGME, is measured for 
years after 1960. As model 7 and 8 in Table 3 and Table A.6 in the Appendix show, for a 
subsample of years after 1960, both infant and child mortality rates increase with higher levels of 
quality of government and decrease with higher levels of democracy. Table A.6 in the Appendix 
also includes the analyses for other time periods, and the results suggest that the effects of the 
no-corruption index vary substantially across subsamples of different time periods. Democracy 
more consistently leads to the improvement of health, except for the subsample of the most 
recent two decades when the variations in levels of corruption across non-democratic countries 
are largely reduced. Further research is required to examine whether the different effects of 
corruption across subsamples are due to that the impacts of governance are contingent on other 
factors or simply the results of biased slices of countries. 
 
4.3. Vertical and Horizontal Accountability 
To test the hypothesis that the combination of both vertical and horizontal accountability 
mechanisms especially urges politicians to provide public goods (hypothesis 2), we include the 
interaction term between the electoral principle and legislative constraint indices in the analyses. 
The results are shown in Table 5.  
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Table 5. Regression estimates of the joint effect of vertical and horizontal accountability 
mechanisms 
  
(1) 
1900- 
(2) 
1900- 
(3) 
1900- 
(4) 
1996- 
(5) 
1960- 
  Infant Mortality Rate, logged 
Electoral Principle 1.178*** 0.0731*** 0.0249 0.0994* 0.0416* 
  [0.0708] [0.0182] [0.0214] [0.0388] [0.0167] 
Legislative Constraints 0.906*** 0.0695*** 0.0477*** 0.173*** 0.0367** 
  [0.0437] [0.0120] [0.0128] [0.0362] [0.0128] 
Electoral Principle  -2.603*** -0.186*** -0.126*** -0.244*** -0.129*** 
 x Legislative Constraints [0.0936] [0.0248] [0.0282] [0.0590] [0.0242] 
No-Corruption Index  0.151*** -0.0195* -0.00176 -0.00902 0.0281*** 
  [0.0318] [0.00850] [0.0104] [0.0220] [0.00776] 
GDP per capita,logged  -0.686*** -0.0156*** -0.0173*** -0.0372*** -0.00199 
  [0.0118] [0.00371] [0.00447] [0.00884] [0.00327] 
Urbanization Rate  -2.432*** -0.00876 -0.0210 -0.0479 0.0392* 
  [0.0521] [0.0176] [0.0196] [0.0729] [0.0174] 
Lagged DV 
 
0.937*** 0.932*** 0.945*** 0.959*** 
  
 
[0.00350] [0.00407] [0.0116] [0.00367] 
GDP Growth Rate 
  
-0.00092*** 
    
  
[0.000184] 
  Petroleum Produced per capita  
  
0.000000 
    
  
[0.000001] 
  Domestic Autonomy 
  
0.00430 
    
  
[0.00276] 
  Armed Conflict, International  
  
0.00528 
    
  
[0.00411] 
  Armed Conflict, Internal  
  
-0.00532 
    
  
[0.00362] 
  _cons 10.15*** 0.335*** 0.397*** 0.394*** 0.142*** 
 
[0.0875] [0.0463] [0.0530] [0.103] [0.0360] 
Country FE v v v v v 
Year FE  v v v v 
Lagged DV  v v v v 
N 8053 7940 5737 2012 5854 
Countries 146 146 106 143 146 
Log likelihood -2266.7 9053.0 7052.0 3667.0 8503.8 
adj. R-sq 0.827 0.990 0.992 0.953 0.987 
All independent variables are lagged for one year. Coefficients of yearly dummies are not reported. Standard error in brackets * 
p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 
Models 1 to 3 cover all the time period 1900 - 2012, while model 4 and 5 are for 
subsamples of different time periods. Consistent with the expectation, the positive effects of 
electoral competition on population health are contingent on whether the legislature is capable to 
control the executive branch. If the power of legislatures is limited, the establishment of free and 
fair elections does not necessarily lead to the improvement of health. The effects of electoral 
accountability mechanisms are especially salient when legislatures are powerful. Based on model 
1, the effects of an increase of the electoral index on mortality rate turn to negative once the 
legislative constraint index reaches the level of 0.45.  
Similarly, the development of legislative power itself is not helpful for health. Both 
vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms lead to the decline of mortality rates only when 
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the other accountability mechanism is also present. The results also show that the contingent 
effects of both accountability mechanisms prevail in subsamples of different time periods and 
across different model specifications. Furthermore, the effects of the quality of government 
indicator become insignificant or positive on mortality rate. 
 
4.4. The Threshold Effects of Democracy 
Table 6. Regression estimates of the threshold effect of democracy on health 
 
(1) 
1900- 
(2) 
1900- 
(3) 
1900- 
(4) 
1996- 
(5) 
1960- 
(6) 
1960- 
  
Infant Mortality Rate, logged  
 
Mortality 
Rate Under 
5 
Electoral Principle 2.278*** 0.123*** 0.0405 0.460* 1.260*** 0.855*** 
  [0.0872] [0.0237] [0.0269] [0.189] [0.125] [0.132] 
Electoral Principle^2  -2.891*** -0.172*** -0.0959*** -0.471* -1.974*** -1.570*** 
  [0.0869] [0.0239] [0.0265] [0.185] [0.123] [0.129] 
No-Corruption 0.279*** -0.0138 -0.000558 -0.0909 0.323*** 0.235*** 
  [0.0319] [0.00862] [0.0104] [0.0630] [0.0366] [0.0397] 
GDP per capita,logged  -0.685*** -0.0170*** -0.0185*** -0.691*** -0.558*** -0.577*** 
  [0.0113] [0.00371] [0.00448] [0.0187] [0.0137] [0.0138] 
Urbanization Rate -2.407*** -0.00812 -0.0195 -3.455*** -2.628*** -3.282*** 
  [0.0511] [0.0175] [0.0196] [0.163] [0.0644] [0.0670] 
Lagged DV  0.935*** 0.931***    
   [0.00355] [0.00414]    
GDP Growth Rate   -0.0009***    
    [0.00018]    
Petroleum Produced    0.0000003    
 per capita   [0.000001]    
Domestic Autonomy    0.00421    
    [0.00274]    
Armed Conflict,    0.00564    
 International   [0.00410]    
Armed Conflict, Internal    -0.00532    
    [0.00362]    
_cons 10.06*** 0.357*** 0.415*** 10.65*** 9.235*** 10.12*** 
 
[0.0830] [0.0462] [0.0529] [0.145] [0.107] [0.111] 
Country FE v v v v v v 
Year FE  v v    
Lagged DV  v v    
N 8055 7942 5739 2012 5870 5488 
Countries 146 146 106 143 146 146 
Log likelihood -2114.5 9053.7 7051.3 1507.7 -981.4 -591.2 
adj. R-sq 0.833 0.990 0.992 0.603 0.676 0.719 
All independent variables are lagged for one year. Coefficients of yearly dummies are not reported. Standard error in brackets * 
p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 
To test the hypothesis that in transitional democracies, political competition does not necessarily 
lead to the provision of public goods (hypothesis 3), we include the squared term of the electoral 
principle index in the analysis. The results are shown in Table 6. Models 1 to 3 include 
observations from 1900 to 2012, and the other models are for subsamples of different time 
periods.  
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Consistent with the hypothesis, the results suggest that there is a curvilinear relationship 
between democracy and health outcome. As the level of democracy increases, infant and child 
mortality rates first slightly increase and then decrease. The lines in Figure 6 represent the 
relationship between the electoral index and mortality rate estimated by model 1, and the gray 
dots are the observed values of the two indicators. In quite close autocracies, a small increase in 
suffrage or political competition does not lead to the improvement of population health. Only 
when the level of democracy reaches certain threshold, mortality rate declines as democracy 
matures. Based on these models, the threshold is at a lower-middle level of the electoral index, 
which roughly represents a regime in which a small number of civil and political groups are 
independent of the ruling regime, freedom of discussion is somewhat respected, and elections 
allow for some competition. Once crossing the threshold, improved political participation and 
competition are leading to improved health. 
Figure 6: The estimated relationship between democracy and morality rate 
	
It has to be noted that this pattern holds even for the subsample of the most recent two 
decades. In addition, when the squared term of electoral principle is included in the model, the 
effects of the no corruption index disappear or remain negative on population health. Since there 
may be also a threshold effect of democracy on corruption, the relationship between democracy 
and governance and thus their potential joint impacts on public goods provision require further 
studies1.  
                                                      
1 Norris (2012) has argued that high levels of electoral democracy and QoG converge, and that could be one reason 
why the effects of corruption on mortality rates seem to vary substantially across subsamples. Another interesting 
perspective worth investigating is the conditions under which corruption or clientelism can serve as substitute for 
social policies and can be used as a way to gain access to public services thus enhancing health outcomes. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we conduct thorough analyses examining the effects of regime type and governance 
quality on the improvement of health outcomes in a country. By utilizing a dataset that covers 
more than 160 countries over the years 1900-2012 and contains nuanced and disaggregated 
measures of democracy and governance, we show that democracy has significant and positive 
effects on population health. Our analyses suggest that the mixed results pointed out in previous 
research are partly due to incomplete samples that do not reflect the entire variation range of 
combinations in terms of democratic development, governance performance and health 
outcomes. The previously widely used indicators of governance quality are only measured for the 
recent two decades, when the variations of the governance indicators across non-democracies are 
quite limited. Furthermore, we find that the positive force of democracy on health outcomes is 
clearer if the threshold effect of democracy is also taken into account. That is, after the 
transitional period of democratic reforms, mortality rate declines as democracy matures. Finally, 
the positive impacts of democracy are especially salient when both vertical and horizontal 
accountability mechanisms are present. The effects of the squared term of democracy indicators 
and the interaction between vertical and horizontal accountability indicators are significant and 
robust across models with different specifications and different time periods. 
The findings have a number of implications. First, the results demonstrate the impact of 
incomplete samples, especially for topics affected by global temporal trends. Limited coverage of 
samples over time and across countries can be influential. For the topic of this paper, the 
important contribution of the V-Dem project is not in providing drastically different measures of 
regime types and governance quality, but in collecting a dataset that covers a long time period of 
most countries for various detailed indicators. 
Second, the results show that the effects of corruption on mortality rates seem to vary 
substantially across samples of different time periods and models with different specifications. 
Further studies are required to examine whether the effects of governance quality are conditional 
on some factors sensitive to temporal patterns, whether the impacts of corrupt governance vary 
across democracies of different ages or different waves, and if other indicators on governance, 
such as state capacity or effectiveness, show the same pattern.   
Finally, our findings highlight the importance of exploring the role of different 
dimensions of democracy. Scholars have pointed out the limitation of electoral competition. How 
different types of horizontal accountability mechanisms improve the provision of public goods or 
limit the distortion of resource allocation are worth further studies. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Independent Variables for the V-Dem Project 
Indicator Question Response categories / Aggregation 
Electoral component index To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved? 
Clarification:  The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve 
responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the 
mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when 
suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate 
freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic 
irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected (directly or 
indirectly) through elections. 
The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link of 
freedom of association (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr), clean elections 
(v2xel_frefair), and elected executive (v2x_accex). The index is thus aggregated using this 
formula: 
.125*v2x_frassoc_thick+.125*v2x_suffr+.125*v2xel_frefair+.125*v2x_accex+.5*v2x_fra
ssoc_thick*v2x_suffr*v2xel_frefair*v2x_accex.  
Legislative constraints on the 
executive index 
To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (e.g., comptroller 
general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, 
investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive? 
The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model 
of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive 
oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature 
opposition parties (v2lgoppart). 
Executive bribery and corrupt 
exchanges 
How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of 
government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in 
exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements? 
0:  It is routine and expected.  
1:  It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive. 
2:  It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict 
when an inducement will be necessary.  
3:  It happens occasionally but is not expected. 
4:  It never, or hardly ever, happens. 
Executive embezzlement and 
theft 
How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of 
government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or 
misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family 
use? 
0:  Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their 
personal or family property.  
1:  Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources 
but treat the rest like personal property. 
2:  About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible 
stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property. 
3:  Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public 
resources but treat selected others like personal property. 
4:  Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible 
stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.  
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Public sector corrupt exchanges How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for 
bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements? 
0:  Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty 
but corrupt exchanges almost all the time. 
1:  Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of 
public employees. 
2:  Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such 
exchanges for petty gains at times. 
3:  Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption 
from time to time. 
4:  No. Never, or hardly ever. 
Legislature corrupt activities Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain? 0:  Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities. 
1:  Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities. 
2:  Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities. 
3:  Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the 
vast majority do not. 
4:  Never, or hardly ever. 
Judicial corruption decision How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra 
payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a 
favorable judicial decision? 
0:  Always. 
1:  Usually. 
2:  About half of the time. 
3:  Not usually. 
4:  Never. 
Domestic autonomy Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the 
conduct of domestic policy?  
0:  Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by 
law or in practice.  
1:  Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of 
domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal 
understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-
understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw.  
2:  Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct 
control of external political actors.  
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Table A.2. Structure of aggregation for the main independent variables 
Mid-Level Democracy 
and Governance Indices  
Lower-Level Indices  Names Indicators v2_tag Indices and 
Indicators 
Electoral Component Index     v2x_EDcomp_thick 
  Freedom of association 
index (thick) 
  v2x_frassoc_thick 
    Party Ban v2psparban 
    Barriers to parties v2psbars 
    Opposition parties autonomy v2psoppaut 
    Elections multiparty v2elmulpar 
    CSO entry and exit v2cseeorgs 
    CSO repression v2csreprss 
  Share of population with 
suffrage 
  v2x_suffr 
    Percent of population with suffrage v2elsuffrage 
  Clean elections index   v2xel_frefair 
    EMB autonomy v2elembaut 
    EMB capacity v2elembcap 
    Election voter registry v2elrgstry 
    Election vote buying v2elvotbuy 
    Election other voting irregularities v2elirreg 
    Election government intimidation v2elintim 
    Election other electoral violence v2elpeace 
    Election free and fair v2elfrfair 
  Elected executive index (de 
jure) 
  v2x_accex 
    Lower chamber elected v2lgello 
    Upper chamber elected v2lgelecup 
    Legislature dominant chamber v2lgdomchm 
    HOS selection by legislature in 
practice 
v2exaphos 
    HOS appointment in practice v2expathhs 
    HOG selection by legislature in 
practice 
v2exaphogp 
    HOG appointment in practice v2expathhg 
    HOS appoints cabinet in practice v2exdfcbhs 
    HOG appoints cabinet in practice v2exdjcbhg 
    HOS dismisses ministers in practice v2exdfdmhs 
    HOG dismisses ministers in 
practice 
v2exdfdshg 
    HOS appoints cabinet in practice v2exdfcbhs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
	
	
	
Legislative constraints on 
the executive index 
  v2xlg_legcon 
  Legislature questions officials in 
practice  
v2lgqstexp 
  Executive oversight  v2lgotovst 
  Legislature investigates in practice  v2lginvstp 
  Legislature opposition parties  v2lgoppart 
No-corruption index    
  Executive bribery and corrupt 
exchanges 
v2exbribe 
  Executive embezzlement and theft v2exembez 
  Public sector corrupt exchanges v2excrptps 
  Legislature corrupt activities v2lgcrrpt 
 Judicial corruption decision v2jucorrdc 
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Table A.3. Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4. Robustness Tests 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Infant Mortality Rate (log) 
Model OLS OLS 
Random 
Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Poisson 
Sample Full Full Full Full Imputed Imputed 
Electoral Principle -54.11*** -21.74*** -0.0348*** 
 
-0.146*** -0.360*** 
 
[1.972] [1.925] [0.00636] 
 
[0.0187] [0.00577] 
     No-Corruption 34.81*** -8.530*** -0.0208** 
 
-0.113*** -0.0679*** 
 
[1.525] [1.684] [0.00643] 
 
[0.0203] [0.00525] 
     Electoral Principle  
   
-0.522*** 
  (10 yr lagged) 
   
[0.0290] 
    No-Corruption  
   
0.0191 
  (10 yr lagged) 
   
[0.0345] 
    GDP per capita (log) -24.15*** -13.38*** -0.0222*** -0.782*** -0.214*** -0.196*** 
 
[0.707] [0.683] [0.00284] [0.0124] [0.00787] [0.00189] 
      Urbanization Rate -59.88*** -44.60*** -0.0329** -2.511*** -0.938*** -2.317*** 
 
[2.900] [2.695] [0.0104] [0.0556] [0.0417] [0.0121] 
      _cons 301.4*** 308.1*** 0.256*** 11.46*** 4.479*** 
 
 
[4.355] [11.68] [0.0407] [0.0809] [0.0800] 
      Year FE 
 
v v v v v 
Country FE 
   
v v v 
Region FE 
 
v 
    Lagged DV 
  
v 
 
v v 
N 8014 8014 7942 7291 19213 19213 
adj. R-sq 0.592 0.727 0.989 0.809 0.846 
 Countries 
  
146 146 202 202 
Log Likelihood -39855.4 -38189.9 
 
-2155.6 -6757.5 -291022.5 		
  
Indicators Mean SD Min Max 
Infant Mortality Rate (log) 3.85 1.04 0.00 5.83 
Mortality Rate Under 5 (log) 3.88 1.19 1.06 6.09 
Electoral Principle of Democracy 0.50 0.27 0.01 0.97 
Legislative Constraints 0.53 0.32 0.03 0.99 
Polity 1.63 7.45 -10.00 10.00 
No-Corruption 0.50 0.32 0.02 0.99 
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 4.33 2.26 0.40 10.00 
WB Rule of Law -0.15 1.00 -2.67 2.00 
WB Government Effectiveness -0.06 1.00 -2.45 2.34 
GDP per capita (log) 7.99 1.03 5.35 10.67 
Urbanization Rate 0.46 0.23 0.01 0.97 
GDP Growth Rate 1.94 5.90 -61.49 65.90 
Petroleum Produced per capita 319.80 2359.69 0.00 78588.80 
Domestic Autonomy 0.81 0.72 -1.90 1.94 
Armed Conflict, International 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Armed Conflict, Internal 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
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Table A.5. Country-years included in Table 2, Table 3, and the Imputed Data 
  Country_name Year range Table 2 Year range Table 3 Imputed Data 
1 Afghanistan 1996 - 2000 1959 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
2 Albania 1996 - 2010 1958 - 2010 1912 - 2012 
3 Algeria 1996 - 2010 1953 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
4 Angola 1996 - 2010 1973 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
5 Argentina 1996 - 2010 1946 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
6 Armenia 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1990 - 2012 
7 Australia 1996 - 2010 1902 - 2010 1901 - 2012 
8 Austria 1996 - 2010 1919 - 2010 1918 - 2012 
9 Azerbaijan 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1990 - 2012 
10 Bahrain 1996 - 2010 - - 
11 Bangladesh 1996 - 2010 1973 - 2010 1971 - 2012 
12 Barbados - - 1900 - 2012 
13 Belarus 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1990 - 2012 
14 Belgium 1996 - 2010 1900 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
15 Benin 1996 - 2008 1959 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
16 Bhutan - - 1900 - 2012 
17 Bolivia 1996 - 2010 1945 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina - 1997 - 2010 1992 - 2012 
19 Botswana 1996 - 2008 1961 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
20 Brazil 1996 - 2010 1929 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
21 Bulgaria 1996 - 2010 1905 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
22 Burkina Faso 1996 - 2010 1959 - 2010 1919 - 2012 
23 Burma/Myanmar 1996 - 2010 1931 - 1987 1900 - 2012 
24 Burundi 1996 - 2008 1961 - 2008 1916 - 2012 
25 Cambodia 1996 - 2010 1974 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
26 Cameroon 1996 - 2010 1964 - 2010 1961 - 2012 
27 Canada 1996 - 2010 1900 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
28 Cape Verde 1996 - 2008 1973 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
29 Central African Republic 1996 - 2008 1950 - 2008 1920 - 2012 
30 Chad 1996 - 2008 1959 - 2008 1920 - 2012 
31 Chile 1996 - 2010 1900 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
32 China 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
33 Colombia 1996 - 2010 1923 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
34 Comoros 1996 - 2008 1972 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
35 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of 1996 - 2010 1960 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
36 Congo, Republic of the 1996 - 2008 1960 - 2008 1903 - 2012 
37 Costa Rica 1996 - 2010 1954 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
38 Croatia 1996 - 2010 1991 - 2010 1941 - 2012 
39 Cuba 1996 - 2008 1931 - 2008 1902 - 2012 
40 Cyprus - - 1900 - 2012 
41 Czech Republic 1996 - 2010 1929 - 2010 1918 - 2012 
42 Denmark 1996 - 2010 1901 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
43 Djibouti 1996 - 2008 1975 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
44 Dominican Republic 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
45 East Timor - - 1900 - 2012 
46 Ecuador 1996 - 2010 1900 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
47 Egypt 1996 - 2010 1913 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
48 El Salvador 1996 - 2008 1939 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
49 Equatorial Guinea 1996 - 2008 - - 
50 Eritrea - 1993 - 1993 1900 - 2012 
51 Estonia 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1918 - 2012 
52 Ethiopia - - 1900 - 2012 
53 Fiji - - 1900 - 2012 
54 Finland 1996 - 2010 1907 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
55 France 1996 - 2010 1902 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
56 Gabon 1996 - 2008 1959 - 2008 1910 - 2012 
57 Gambia 1996 - 2008 1955 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
58 Georgia 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1990 - 2012 
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59 
German Democratic 
Republic - - 1946 - 1990 
60 Germany 1996 - 2010 1903 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
61 Ghana 1996 - 2010 1951 - 2010 1902 - 2012 
62 Greece 1996 - 2010 1920 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
63 Guatemala 1996 - 2010 1956 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
64 Guinea 1996 - 2008 1950 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
65 Guinea-Bissau 1996 - 2008 1975 - 2007 1900 - 2012 
66 Guyana - - 1900 - 2012 
67 Haiti 1996 - 2008 1955 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
68 Honduras 1996 - 2008 1920 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
69 Hong Kong - - 1900 - 2010 
70 Hungary 1996 - 2010 1920 - 2010 1918 - 2012 
71 Iceland - - 1900 - 2012 
72 India 1996 - 2010 1910 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
73 Indonesia 1996 - 2010 1949 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
74 Iran 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
75 Iraq 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1920 - 2012 
76 Ireland 1996 - 2010 1921 - 2010 1919 - 2012 
77 Israel 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1948 - 2012 
78 Italy 1996 - 2010 1900 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
79 Ivory Coast 1996 - 2010 1955 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
80 Jamaica 1996 - 2010 1913 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
81 Japan 1996 - 2010 1946 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
82 Jordan 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1922 - 2012 
83 Kazakhstan 1996 - 2010 1991 - 2010 1990 - 2012 
84 Kenya 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
85 Korea, North 1996 - 2008 1959 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
86 Korea, South 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
87 Kosovo - - 1999 - 2012 
88 Kuwait 1996 - 2010 - 1900 - 2012 
89 Kyrgyzstan 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1990 - 2012 
90 Laos 1996 - 2008 1950 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
91 Latvia 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1920 - 2012 
92 Lebanon 2005 - 2008 1955 - 2008 1918 - 2012 
93 Lesotho 1996 - 2008 1950 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
94 Liberia 1996 - 2008 1950 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
95 Libya 1996 - 2008 1957 - 2008 1934 - 2012 
96 Lithuania 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1918 - 2012 
97 Macedonia 1996 - 2010 1991 - 2010 1991 - 2012 
98 Madagascar 1996 - 2010 1959 - 2009 1900 - 2012 
99 Malawi 1996 - 2010 1954 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
100 Malaysia 1996 - 2010 1955 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
101 Maldives - - 1900 - 2012 
102 Mali 1996 - 2010 1959 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
103 Malta - - 1900 - 2012 
104 Mauritania 1996 - 2008 1950 - 2008 1904 - 2012 
105 Mauritius - - 1900 - 2012 
106 Mexico 1996 - 2010 1949 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
107 Moldova 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1990 - 2012 
108 Mongolia 1996 - 2008 1950 - 2008 1911 - 2012 
109 Montenegro - - 1900 - 2012 
110 Morocco 1996 - 2010 1962 - 2010 1912 - 2012 
111 Mozambique 1996 - 2010 1973 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
112 Namibia 1996 - 2008 1959 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
113 Nepal 1996 - 2008 1959 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
114 Netherlands 1996 - 2010 1901 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
115 New Zealand 1996 - 2010 1902 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
116 Nicaragua 1996 - 2008 1920 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
117 Niger 1996 - 2010 1956 - 2010 1922 - 2012 
118 Nigeria 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1914 - 2012 
119 Norway 1996 - 2010 1900 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
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120 Oman 1996 - 2010 - - 
121 Pakistan 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1947 - 2012 
122 Palestine/British Mandate - - 1918 - 1947 
123 Palestine/Gaza - - 1948 - 2012 
124 Palestine/West Bank - - 1948 - 2012 
125 Panama 1996 - 2008 1949 - 2008 1903 - 2012 
126 Papua New Guinea - - 1900 - 2012 
127 Paraguay 1996 - 2008 1950 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
128 Peru 1996 - 2010 1929 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
129 Philippines 1996 - 2010 1907 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
130 Poland 1996 - 2010 1929 - 2010 1918 - 2012 
131 Portugal 1996 - 2010 1909 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
132 Qatar 1996 - 2010 1971 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
133 Romania 1996 - 2010 1910 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
134 Russia 1996 - 2010 1906 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
135 Rwanda 1996 - 2008 1961 - 2008 1916 - 2012 
136 Sao Tome and Principe - 1975 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
137 Saudi Arabia 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1932 - 2012 
138 Senegal 1996 - 2010 1957 - 2010 1904 - 2012 
139 Serbia - - 1900 - 2012 
140 Seychelles - 1967 - 2008 1903 - 2012 
141 Sierra Leone 1996 - 2008 1954 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
142 Singapore 1996 - 2010 - 1900 - 2012 
143 Slovakia 1996 - 2010 1993 - 2010 1939 - 2012 
144 Slovenia 1996 - 2010 1989 - 2010 1989 - 2012 
145 Solomon Islands - - 1900 - 2012 
146 Somalia 1996 - 2008 1980 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
147 Somaliland - - 1900 - 2012 
148 South Africa 1996 - 2010 1910 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
149 South Sudan - - 2011 - 2012 
150 South Yemen - - 1900 - 1990 
151 Spain 1996 - 2010 1901 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
152 Sri Lanka 1996 - 2010 1948 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
153 Sudan - - 1900 - 2012 
154 Suriname - - 1900 - 2012 
155 Swaziland 1996 - 2008 1964 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
156 Sweden 1996 - 2010 1902 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
157 Switzerland 1996 - 2010 1902 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
158 Syria 1996 - 2010 1950 - 1964 1918 - 2012 
159 Taiwan 1996 - 2008 1950 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
160 Tajikistan 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1990 - 2012 
161 Tanzania 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1914 - 2012 
162 Thailand 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
163 Togo 1996 - 2008 1950 - 2008 1916 - 2012 
164 Trinidad and Tobago 1996 - 2008 1950 - 2008 1900 - 2012 
165 Tunisia 1996 - 2010 1958 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
166 Turkey 1996 - 2010 1949 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
167 Turkmenistan 1996 - 2010 1991 - 2010 1990 - 2012 
168 Uganda 1996 - 2010 1953 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
169 Ukraine 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1990 - 2012 
170 United Arab Emirates 1996 - 2010 - - 
171 United Kingdom 1996 - 2010 1900 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
172 United States 1996 - 2010 1932 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
173 Uruguay 1996 - 2010 1920 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
174 Uzbekistan 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1990 - 2012 
175 Vanuatu - - 1906 - 2012 
176 Venezuela 1996 - 2010 1929 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
177 
Vietnam, Democratic 
Republic of - - 1945 - 2012 
178 Vietnam, Republic of - - 1902 - 1975 
179 Yemen 1996 - 2010 1990 - 2010 1918 - 2012 
180 Zambia 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1911 - 2012 
 40 
181 Zimbabwe 1996 - 2010 1950 - 2010 1900 - 2012 
 
 
 
Table A.6. The Effects of Democracy and Governance in Different Subsamples 
 
(1) 
1960- 
(2) 
1946- 
(3) 
1974- 
(4) 
1960- 
(5) 
1960- 
DV Infant Mortality Rate (log) 
Electoral Principle -0.0485*** -0.0394*** -0.0652***   
  [0.00714] [0.00772] [0.00866]   
Legislative Constraints    -0.0339***  
     [0.00505]  
Polity      -0.00172*** 
      [0.000216] 
No-Corruption Index  0.0204** -0.0284*** 0.0493*** 0.0175* 0.0248** 
  [0.00767] [0.00816] [0.00950] [0.00747] [0.00785] 
GDP per capita, logged -0.00378 -0.0120*** -0.00707 -0.00430 -0.00806* 
  [0.00325] [0.00363] [0.00414] [0.00321] [0.00333] 
Urbanization Rate  0.0478** 0.0177 0.116*** 0.0419* 0.0560** 
 
[0.0174] [0.0179] [0.0262] [0.0172] [0.0177] 
_cons 0.173*** 0.289*** 0.207*** 0.172*** 0.184*** 
 
[0.0356] [0.0405] [0.0450] [0.0352] [0.0367] 
     Year FE v v v v v 
Country FE v v v v v 
Lagged DV v v v v v 
N 5855 6782 4485 5916 5605 
adj. R-sq 0.987 0.986 0.977 0.987 0.988 
Countries 146 146 145 146 143 
Log Likelihood 8487.4 8413.2 6576.3 8604.4 8196.3 
 
